Our thanks to Dave Hollenbeck for this.
Quote: The difficulty in receiving weapons from the United States could explain whyEgypt approached Russia.
Ok, but in 2013, Obama gave his approval to carry thru with
an old deal (originally with Mubarak, whom Obama forced out for being too
pro-Christian and too pro-Israel and not radically Islamic) for F-16 fighter
aircraft.
Now comes Russia to fill the vacuum in a more moderate Egypt
which does not meet the approval of the Islamic leaning Obama.
Not how this kind of deal helps make up for the economic
sanctions the Obama slapped on Russia for doing essentially in Crimea what the
West had done in Kiev.
Weird, eh?
http://www.algemeiner.com/
MiG-35s for Egypt: A Veritable Change of Direction?
INSS Insight No. 544, May 1, 2014
Yiftah Shapir, Zvi Magen, Gal Perel
http://www.inss.org.il/index.
SUMMARY: According to a number of media reports published in late April
2014, Egypt is soon to sign a large arms deal with Russia for the purchase
of 24 MiG-35 fighter jets. If the arms deal is completed, it will represent
a significant event in the Middle East strategic picture, another sign of
reduced United States involvement in the region. For Russia, this would be a
meaningful strategic achievement in its global struggle against the West.
For Israel, one or two squadrons of aircraft such as the MiG-29 would not
have much tactical significance. At the same time, the strategic
significance could be decisive if the conflict between Russia and the West
escalates and Russia gains an additional foothold in Egypt. However, the
deal has not yet been signed, and there are many obstacles to its
conclusion - technical, operational, economic, and most of all, political
and strategic.
According to a number of media reports published in late April 2014, Egypt
is soon to sign a large arms deal with Russia for the purchase of 24 MiG-35
fighter jets. Reports of contacts between Egypt and Russia have surfaced in
recent months, particularly in November 2013 following the visit to Cairo by
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu,
and in February 2014, when then-Egyptian Defense Minister Abdul Fattah
al-Sisi visited Moscow.
These earlier reports spoke of a much larger arms deal that would include
air and coastal defense systems, Mi-35 attack helicopters, and fighter jets
(actually the MiG-29). In addition, it was reported that the deals would be
financed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The MiG-35 was presented for the first time at an air show in India in 2007.
It emerged from the older MiG-29 series, and its developers define it as a
4++ generation jet fighter. The advances in this model over its predecessor
(MiG-29M/M2) include a modern information system, compatibility with Russian
and Western weapon systems, and a variety of integrated self-defense
systems. The MiG-35 is intended as a multi-role aircraft with good
capabilities in both air-to-air missions and precision attacks on ground
targets in all types of weather. It will be equipped with Zhuk-AE radar,
which is an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar that is more
advanced than the radar used in the MiG-29M/M2. Its engines will also be
more advanced. The aircraft has not yet entered production, and the signing
of the first contract for supply of the aircraft to the Russian air force
has been postponed to 2016.
Egypt receives $1.3 billion a year in US aid, and since 1979, the Egyptian
military has purchased primarily American equipment. At the same time, Cairo
has in fact bought some weaponry or other defense equipment from other
countries, including Russia (from which it purchased upgrades to its
outdated air-defense systems). Moreover, relations with the United States
have cooled since the start of the Arab Spring in Egypt. In August 2011, the
United States canceled its participation in the bi-annual Bright Star
military exercise because of the political situation in Egypt after
President Mubarak’s ouster. And while in 2012, it continued to transfer in
full the annual aid to Egypt, this situation changed after President Morsi
was deposed in early July 2013. Although the United States supplied Egypt
with four F-16s that month (from a deal signed in 2010 that included forty
aircraft), the administration later announced that it was delaying shipment
of four other F-16s. In October 2013, the US government announced its
decision to “recalibrate” defense aid to Egypt and suspend part of it
because of the US law prohibiting provision of weapons to regimes that came
to power through a military coup. Inter alia, it was decided to stop
delivery of the F-16, Apache helicopters, air defense systems, and the
Abrams tank; once again the US canceled its participation in Bright Star.
However, in April 2014, Washington gave permission for the Apaches to be
delivered to Egypt – which followed the delivery of the first the first of
four Ambassador fast missile craft to the Egyptian navy in November 2013. as
planned.
The difficulty in receiving weapons from the United States could explain why
Egypt approached Russia. Furthermore, it clearly shows that the Egyptian
leadership is dissatisfied with US Middle East policy. At the same time, the
reports on the latest deal raise a number of questions.
First, on the technical side, beyond the fact that the MiG-35 is a model
that has not yet entered production, the Russian technology culture is
totally different from that of the United States. The Egyptian military, and
the air force in particular, has undergone a complex, lengthy, and expensive
transition since the 1980s from Soviet technology and a Soviet combat
doctrine to American technology and doctrine. While Egypt continues to use a
number of Russian-manufactured systems (in particular, air defense systems),
the purchase of modern Russian aircraft will require a new logistical system
that is separate from the system used for aircraft of American manufacture.
This involves not only procurement of the planes, but also of new,
unfamiliar weapon systems (including air-to-air missiles, air-to-ground
missiles, and the like), and each such weapon system requires its own
maintenance and training system. This is a long and expensive process, and
the logic of embarking on it is questionable.
Second, since the start of the events of 2011, Egypt’s economy has declined,
and it is doubtful whether Egypt has the ability to enter into expensive
weapons deals. While it has been reported that the deals will be financed by
Saudi Arabia or the UAE, there is room for doubt. Both of these countries
have serious grievances against the United States and its policy in the
region, and Saudi provision of aid to Egypt when the United States is
threatening to stop its aid could well be perceived as defiance of the
United States. Nonetheless, this is a far cry from Saudi willingness to fund
a deal between Egypt and Russia, which is also a source of contention for
Riyadh (especially because of Russia’s support for the Bashar Assad regime).
Third, although there is anger at the United States (and at President Obama
in particular) and a desire to defy it, it is doubtful that Egypt would
actually be prepared to cut off ties and give up US defense aid and weapons
purchases from the United States. And finally, as of this time, reports of
the arms deal (first published in Israel) have not been confirmed by Russian
or Egyptian sources, nor have the prominent media outlets in Europe and the
United States covered the story.
The Russian Dimension
Although the arms deal under discussion has much economic value in its own
right, the clear Russian interest is in the political-strategic realm. This
deal is a component of Russia’s overall effort to rehabilitate its status in
the Middle East, which was greatly undermined during the Arab Spring - in
Russia’s view, with active Western assistance, as part of the ongoing global
conflict. Thus, Russia has increased efforts in the past year at
rapprochement with Middle East countries, both those with which it had
cooperative relations in the past and others as well. In the meantime, it is
clear that Moscow has returned to “arms supply diplomacy.” There have been
negotiations with Iraq for some time on comprehensive defense procurement;
in talks with Lebanon and Jordan, Russia has even discussed the possibility
of supplying Jordan with a nuclear reactor; a large arms deal was discussed
between Russia and Saudi Arabia, despite basic disagreements between the two
countries; and there has been talk of Saudi funding of possible purchases
from Russia by other countries in the region.
Russia’s conduct in the Middle East has recently displayed certain changes
because of the Ukrainian crisis, which is at the center of the international
agenda and the main arena for the superpower conflict. At the same time,
Russia has designated the Middle East as another front in its global
struggle against the West, partly to balance pressures on it in Eastern
Europe. In this context, increased Russian activity in Syria and possibly
also in Iran is especially notable. In addition, Russia is expanding its
operations elsewhere in the region and thus demonstrating its challenge of
the West. Russia thus has a definite interest in the arms deal with Egypt,
as it could significantly upgrade its international standing and serve as a
worthy example for the other countries in the region for expanding
cooperation.
Conclusion
If the arms deal between Egypt and Russia is completed, it will represent a
significant event in the Middle East strategic picture, another sign of
reduced United States involvement in the region. For Russia, this would be a
meaningful strategic achievement in its global struggle against the West.
For Israel, one or two squadrons of aircraft such as the MiG-29 would not
have much tactical significance. At the same time, the strategic
significance could be decisive if the conflict between Russia and the West
escalates and Russia gains an additional foothold in Egypt.
However, the deal has not yet been signed, and there are many obstacles to
its conclusion - technical, operational, economic, and most of all,
political and strategic. The United States still has numerous tools to put
pressure on Egypt and prevent the deal from taking place. Therefore, reports
should be seen more as an alarm for decision makers in Washington than as
the herald of a substantive strategic change.
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