https://www.wsj.com/articles/
b5f94f8073e24b9a9d0634857b40ed
Director Christopher Wray has been on "witness protection program" since all
investigations started and seems ill prepared to guide FBI back into criminal
prosecution role instead of smoky intelligence role. Most of his public
statements, both under oath and otherwise, reflect defensive postures rather
than a strong commitment to getting FBI back on track.
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WALL STREET JOURNAL
What Went Wrong at the FBI
After 9/11, the bureau lost its law-enforcement ethos as it tried to become more
of an intelligence agency.
Federal Bureau of Investigation headquarters in Washington, D.C. PHOTO: T.J.
KIRKPATRICK/BLOOMBERG NEWS
By
Thomas J. Baker
March 19, 2018 6:10 p.m. ET
Americans have grown increasingly skeptical since 2016 of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, an institution they once regarded as the world's greatest
law-enforcement agency. I spent 33 years in a variety of positions with the FBI,
and I am troubled by this loss of faith. Many lapses have come to light, and
each has been thoroughly covered. But why did they happen? The answer is a
cultural change that occurred in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
For reasons that seemed justified at the time, the bureau set out to become an
"intelligence driven" organization. That had unintended consequences. The FBI's
culture had been rooted in law enforcement. A law-enforcement agency deals in
facts, to which agents may have to swear in court. That is why "lack of candor"
has always been a firing offense. An intelligence agency deals in estimates and
best guesses. Guesses are not allowed in court. Intelligence agencies often bend
a rule, or shade the truth, to please their political masters. In the FBI, as a
result, there now is politicization, polarization, and no sense of the bright
line that separates the legal from the extralegal.
Part of making the FBI more like an intelligence agency was the centralization
of case management at headquarters in Washington, rather than the field offices
around the country. With this came the placing of operational decisions in the
hands of more "politically sensitive" individuals at headquarters.
The 9/11 investigations and related matters were the first to be moved from the
field to headquarters. But the trend culminated with the investigations into
Hillary Clinton's emails and Russian election interference-both run from
headquarters as well. Levels of review-and independent judgment-were eliminated.
Thus, we learn that Peter Strzok -who held the relatively high rank of deputy
assistant director of counterintelligence-was himself conducting interviews in
both politically sensitive investigations.
After 9/11 there was much talk of the negative consequences of a "wall" between
criminal and intelligence investigations. There was always-it was part of our
culture-a discussion about how to proceed at the outset of a counterintelligence
or terrorism investigation. To seek a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, with its lower standard of probable cause, when one would
ultimately pursue a prosecution was considered an abuse of FISA. It is still an
abuse. To shade the truth in a FISA application-as occurred with the " Steele
Dossier"-is characteristic behavior of an intelligence agency, not a "swear to
tell the truth" law-enforcement organization.
FISA was never intended as a tool to pursue Americans. It was to be used to
gather intelligence about agents of a foreign power operating in the U.S. The
aim of this monitoring was to produce intelligence for our national decision
makers. It was not intended to be used in criminal prosecutions. If an American
is suspected of operating as an agent of a foreign power, that individual should
be pursued under the Espionage Act, a criminal statute. The fruits of that
monitoring could then be used in court for a prosecution. The use of FISA to
target a U.S. citizen is the most egregious abuse uncovered so far.
As former FBI Director William Webster repeatedly told us agents: "We must do
the job the American people expect of us, in the way that the Constitution
demands of us." All actions and decisions must once again be viewed though that
prism. The Justice Department inspector general and others are now looking at
specific alleged abuses.
Perhaps Deputy Director Andrew McCabe's firing is a start. Mr. McCabe's
statement, in response to his firing, that "the big picture is a tale of what
can happen when law enforcement is politicized" is, ironically, true.
What is needed is much more-a renewal of the FBI's culture. When the smoke
clears from the current controversies, Director Christopher Wray must help the
bureau turn the page on this intelligence chapter and get the bureau back to the
law-enforcement culture of fact-finding and truth-telling that once made us all
so proud.
Mr. Baker is a retired FBI special agent and legal attaché.
Appeared in the March 20, 2018, print edition as 'What Went Wrong At the FBI.'
Terry Payne
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