Russia’s Strategy
Dec 28, 2015
Two
things are necessary to understand a nation’s strategy. The first is to
view the world through the eyes of that nation… to know what it hopes
for and fears. The second is to understand that the nation’s leader is
far from a free agent. He (or she) became the leader by making endless
political and financial deals along the way, and he remains the leader
only to the extent that he satisfies others. There are also constraints
and imperatives surrounding the leader that shape his actions. Some
derive from internal politics, but the most important have to do with
power, or the lack of it. In order to deal with an adversary, or to
crush him, understanding the world from his point of view is essential.
People
tend to personalize power. We believe that the leader makes decisions
as he wishes. When he does what we want him to do, he is wise and
decent. When he thwarts our plans, he is a fool and a monster. This
makes the world a simpler place… but also a fantasy land. It imagines
that someone rules a country of millions alone and by his own whimsical
neurosis. We see that personalization when people talk about Russia.
The
collapse of the Soviet Union was the result of an inefficient economy,
low oil prices, and extreme demands on the Soviet defense system. Its
collapse also led to a cataclysmic decade. Plunging into privatization,
the economy was essentially looted by those best positioned to take
advantage of it. These were extremely clever and fast businessmen, the
intelligence and security services, and Western investors—all of whom
became extraordinarily wealthy. The rest of the Federation plunged into
far worse poverty than they had experienced in the late Soviet period.
What Westerners thought of as liberalization was, from most Russians’
point of view, simply devastating. Even most of the oligarchs and the
FSB (formerly KGB) could see this situation was unsustainable and
realized that instability in Russia would ultimately threaten their
newfound wealth.
This
internal imbalance in wealth was compounded by Russia’s strategic
position. The Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, worked to
maintain a buffer zone between itself and the European Peninsula
consisting by the 20th century of the Baltics, Belarus, and Ukraine.
After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, these were all independent states,
and the West began asserting its influence on them. From the Russian
point of view, this was catastrophic. Russia had defeated Germany in
World War II only because of its strategic depth. Westerners respond
that surely Russians have no fear of invasion today. But Russia
remembers that in 1932, Germany was a tattered liberal democracy, hardly
armed, with massive economic problems. By 1938, it was the dominant
military and economic power in Europe. By 1941, German soldiers were
outside of Moscow. The Russians know for a fact that intentions—and even
capabilities— can change in the twinkling of an eye. What Europe or the
United States intends now has nothing to do with what they could face in 10 years.
Indeed, the Russians saw the contempt with which the West held them in
Kosovo in 1999… where their desire that the West not bomb Serbia was
brushed aside as if it had no significance.
The
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were held together by their
intelligence and security services—and by money and the distribution of
resources. The region was vast and disorderly. Privileges were used to
hold the elites and the security services and to frighten them and
others. It was no accident that the most efficient and effective
institution in the Soviet Union had been the KGB. And it was no surprise
that when it became clear that Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s
liberalization had failed catastrophically, it was a KGB officer, deeply
embedded with both the intelligence service and the oligarchs, who took
over.
That
it was Vladimir Putin was not the key. There were many like him. That
it was an FSB man who knew where the oligarchs (some of them former KGB
officials themselves) kept their money was the key. For only if the
oligarchs were served could a new regime be created, and only if they
could be intimidated could the new regime take firm control. No matter
who the actual person was, an FSB man who knew the oligarchs well, was
going to take over.
Russia
had two imperatives. The first was to create order out of the chaos of
the Yeltsin years. Critical to this was the strategy of using the export
of raw materials to fund economic modernization. The means to do this
was reversing much of the privatization of the 1990s, crushing resistant
oligarchs, and aligning the rest with the export strategy. The second
imperative was to restore the buffer zones to the West, accepting the
Baltic’s membership in NATO, but being utterly insistent on at least the
neutralization of Ukraine. Ukraine provides Russia with much needed
strategic depth, forcing invading armies to stretch their supply lines
before reaching major Russian cities. It was Ukraine where, in World War
II, the Wehrmacht had bled out its life. Ukraine also hosted Russia's
Black Sea Fleet on the Crimean Peninsula, which gives Russia access to
the Black Sea and Mediterranean. The two imperatives ran parallel.
The
United States and other Western countries had their own strategy in the
region, trying to replicate the Eastern European uprisings of 1989 in
other nations in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Their goal was
to create liberal democracies, and the means was to support democratic
uprisings through funding non-government organizations that could shape
and organize political change. From the Western point of view, the
question of the Russian Federation’s borders had been settled in 1991,
and the fate of other former Soviet republics was not Russia’s concern.
From
the Russian point of view, the West and particularly the United States
were undertaking regime change by funding anti-Russian factions under
the guise of liberalization. Liberalization to many Russians was merely
another word for economic looting. Russian decision makers saw these
uprisings as attempting to create a network of pro-American states
intended to deny Russia its buffer zone. For the Russian leadership, the
American justification of human rights was simply a cover for what had
to be an attempt to destroy the Russian Federation by surrounding it
with hostile states along borders that were indefensible due to
topography and distances. Whether this was the American intent or
whether this was a Russian misreading was immaterial. The Russians could
not assume anything but the worst case.
Ukraine
was the heart of everything for Russia. If Ukraine was part of the
Western alliance system, Russia could not be defended. Russia believed
that if the Americans were as obsessed with Ukraine as they appeared to
be, their intentions could only be malign. In the Russian view, those
malign intentions dated back to 2004 when the US underwrote the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine, the same year the Baltics were admitted to NATO.
The Russians reached a conclusion: The United States was not only a
hostile power, but was actively seeking to undermine Moscow’s regional
influence.
In
2008, seven weeks before Lehman Brothers collapsed, the Russians went
to war with Georgia. The issue over the security of the Caucasus was
really secondary to a simple message the Russians delivered to Ukraine.
Georgia was a de facto American ally, and from the perspective of Moscow
strategists, US entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan meant Washington
was unable to come to Georgia’s aid. The message to Ukraine: this is
what American guarantees are worth. It was a warning not to stake
national security on American guarantees. To a great extent, it worked,
as Ukraine shifted from a neutral to a pro-Russian stance.
Starting
in late 2013 and again looking at it through Russia’s eyes, the
Americans resumed their attempt to subvert Ukraine by underwriting the
uprising in Kiev. This time, however, it was the Russians who failed
their allies. Russian intelligence clearly failed to understand what was
happening in Kiev and failed to counter it. Russia “seized” Crimea
officially, but Crimea was already a major Russian base by treaty and
was dominated by the Russians. They changed the legal status… not the
correlation of forces. In eastern Ukraine, their attempt to trigger a
pro-Russian uprising failed, and the Ukrainian forces, as poorly trained
and armed as they were, ultimately fought the Russians to a standstill.
If 2004 was a warning to others in the region about American weakness,
2014–15 was an American warning to them about Russian weakness.
The
events of 2008 led to Russia’s economic crisis of 2014. As I have
written previously, the economic crisis in Europe and the United States
led to the decreased appetite for Chinese exports. This in turn lessened
China’s need for importing raw materials. After the markets caught up
with reality, oil prices plunged, and with them the viability of the
Russian economy. Behind this was a much greater problem: the failure of
Russia to use oil revenues to modernize its economy. The deals Putin
made to become president required the diversion of funds from that
purpose to gaining political support for Putin. The state could not both
manage the support base of its regime and modernize the economy. It was
an economic and managerial impossibility. Thus, Russia was massively
vulnerable to energy price cut offs. It also lost one of its major
weapons—the ability to cut exports of gas—because Russia urgently needed
that cash flow and because the Europe ans had worked hard to diversify
sources of energy.
Thus,
in 2014, Russia faced a dual crisis. It had failed to prevent the
installation of a pro-Western government in Kiev, and its economy had
been struck a terrific blow. Russia feared that, given its imbalance
from the two blows, the United States would follow up with further
aggressive moves. When a boxer is staggered, he goes into a clinch. In
this case, the Russians understood that the Americans’ vulnerability
remained an overextension in the Middle East. Russia also recalled that
the overextension in 2008 had paralyzed the United States in Georgia.
For Russia, the period from Sept. 11, 2001 until 2014 was a period in
which the United States was so obsessed with the Middle East, it had no
resources to place elsewhere. Russia’s strategy, therefore, was to
prolong the American focus in the Middle East, while creating the basis
for a settlement over Ukraine.
From
a military sense, the Russian intervention in Syria was of little
consequence. A small number of fighter planes were sent with enough
troops to protect them. However, from the psychological point of view,
the Russians hoped to transform their position. First, they had
demonstrated the ability to project power far from Russia’s borders.
Second, Moscow’s intervention was designed to make it appear that Russia
had saved the Assad regime, and therefore it drove the decision. The US
had no intention of overthrowing Assad while IS was the likely
beneficiary.
However, the Russians made the US appear to be an equal power. This was critical to Russia both overseas and at home.
Currently,
the Russians are trying to increase their influence, reaching out to
Iran and to the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as talking to the
Israelis. They are brilliantly creating the sense of Russia as a great
power and causing the US potential grief. At the same time, the Russians
have sought to minimize conflict in Ukraine. The goal is either to
split Germany (which wants a settlement) from the United States, or to
get the US to agree to a settlement. Such a settlement would include an
agreement that Ukraine can have a pro-Western government, but that no
Western military assistance or forces would be made available. Eastern
Ukraine would be given some autonomy. And Crimea would return to some
prior condition in which Russia is the overwhelming power, but Ukraine
has some formal rights.
That
would be the Russian goal. But it should be noted that Russian strategy
is built on a base of sand. Syria is intended to roll back the reality
of Ukraine, but nothing can roll back the reality of the Russian
dependence on a deeply discounted resource for its economic survival.
Russia is engaged in a massive defense buildup in the face of this
economic crisis. And its deployment in Syria is far from decisive. It
can reach out to Iran and others, but they are aware of the limits of
Russian power.
In
the long run, the Russian Federation is facing the same problem as the
Soviet Union did… and will thus weaken. Its current strategy is
constrained by weakness but compelled by the fact it is the only option
available. A strategy of bluff follows from the reality of weakness when
that weakness threatens to be fatal. Meaning that the economic and
strategic weakness we see makes Russia more of a risktaker in the coming
years, not less.
Having
been unable to overcome its core economic weakness and having a clearly
dysfunctional intelligence service on which it must depend for national
unity, Russian strategy appears logical. Its economic weakness is
deeply rooted in its political arrangements. The FSB’s weakness stems as
much from its deep involvement in the complex financial arrangements
that run Russia as the challenges of maintaining the security of the
Federation. Russia’s strategy is not the result of miscalculation but of
hard realities.
And,
therefore, any strategy based on bluffing strength when weakness is
manifest is unlikely to succeed. Russia is trying to buy time, but time
may hurt rather than help. The economic bleeding will not stop soon. The
United States has time on its side and can afford to be clumsy. In
fact, that clumsiness is built into its national strategy, which is a
story for a later date.
George Friedman
Editor, This Week in Geopolitics
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